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I. Introduction
Congress enacted Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19341 to restrict the ability of corporate insiders to use their positions
for the purpose of making short-swing profits in trading the corpora-
tion's shares. Insiders can benefit from advance information by pur-
chasing or selling shares in their company prior to public disclosure
of inside information, and reselling or repurchasing after the disclosure
has the expected effect on the market price of the company's stock.
Moreover insiders may use their positions to structure corporate policy
in such a way as to manipulate the market price of the stock for a short
period of time, in order to buy or sell their own stock during that time
at artificially high or low prices. Section 16(b) provides that profits
realized by the insider on the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase,
within a six-month period, of equity securities of his corporation will
inure to the corporation. The Act defines "insiders" as officers, directors,
and ten per cent shareholders of the securities issuer. Either the issuer,
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1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b) , 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recover-
able by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased
or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter but
no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was
realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover an) transaction where such
beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.
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or a shareholder of the issuer,2 can institute a private suit to compel the
insider to remit his short-swing profits to the company. This "crude
rule of thumb"'3 establishes simple, objective standards of proof. A
showing of actual misuse of inside information or of actual manipula-
tion is unnecessary to prove a violation of Section 16(b), and proof
that there was no use of inside information or manipulation is not a
defense.4
Because of its limited coverage, Section 16(b) does not eliminate all
opportunities for profit from the use of inside information and manipu-
lation. For example, the insider who holds the securities for six months
escapes any Section 16(b) liability.5 Certain transactions may fall outside
the statutory language of "purchase and sale" or "sale and purchase,"
and the provision applies only to "equity securities," a term of am-
biguous meaning in some instances7 Any ten per cent shareholder,
director or officer is conclusively presumed to have used his corporate
position if he realizes short-swing profits; other persons are conclusively
presumed to lack such advantages and are free from Section 16(b)
liability.8
As might be expected, these presumptions encourage the de facto
insider to remain outside the statutory definition of "insider." Ac-
cordingly some litigation and SEC rule-making since the enactment of
2. If the issuer-corporation does not file suit within sixty days after receiving a request
to do so from a shareholder or if the issuer does not diligently prosecute the suit, then
the shareholder can file suit in the issuer's behalf. Id.
3. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943).
4. E.g., Western Auto Sup. Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 7,13 n.7 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
1943).
5. The tax laws encourage holding stock for six months, since the stockholder can
obtain the lower long-term capital gains tax rate on his profits. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1222(3).
6. See, e.g., Note, Short-Swing "Purchase and Sales" Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 448 (1966); Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Deter-
mining Inside Liabilities under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949 (1959).
7. E.g., Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); Jefferson Lake
Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20, 23 (E.D. La. 1952).
8. The arbitrariness of these presumptions is illustrated by the following example.
Charles Bluhdorn's Gulf & Western Industries, a "hot" conglomerate, recently purchased
9.8 per cent of the stock of Armour & Co. in preparation for a takeover bid. Bluhdorn had
purposely avoided becoming an insider by keeping his holdings in Armour under 10 per
cent. The takeover was blocked and Armour management, offended by Bluhdorn's tactics,
had its revenge by repurchasing Armour stock on the open market, eventually raising
Bluhdorn's percentage holdings in the outstanding shares to 12.5 per cent, thus making
him an insider under Section 16(b) and barring him from pocketing short.swing profits.
Yet realistically Gulf & Western was anything but an insider since Armour was rather
maliciously trying to penalize the company rather than providing it with any beneficial
inside information. See TiME, Mar. 7, 1969, at 78, col. 3.
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Section 16(b) has centered around the issue of who is an "officer"" and
who is "directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten
per centum of any class of any equity security" of the issuer?
0 In
contrast to the problems of interpreting the terms "officer" and
"owner," after twenty years of Section 16(b) litigation two prominent
securities scholars were able to report that "[t]he application of the
section to directors has not caused nearly so much difficulty, and has
involved no litigation."" The statute defines "director" as "any
director of a corporation or any person performing similar functions
with respect to any organization."'' This was thought to be sufficiently
descriptive to prevent any problems in its application.
Despite this apparent clarity, a line of cases developed suggesting
that a director of an issuer, because of his relationship with another
business entity, might serve that second entity under such circum-
stances that the second entity was, for purposes of Section 16(b)
liability, also a director of the issuer? 3 Until very recently these judicial
suggestions were only dicta, but the ice was broken by the Second Cir-
cuit' 4 in Feder v. Martin Marietta Corporation.'0 George M. Bunker,
the president of Martin Marietta Corporation [Martin], served as a
director of the Sperry Rand Corporation [Sperry], the issuer. During
Bunker's tenure as a Sperry director, Martin purchased Sperry common
stock and sold it at a profit within six months. Martin was not a
Sperry officer, director, or ten per cent shareholder. Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit overruled the district court's10 findings of fact
7 and
concluded that "Bunker, in fact, was a Martin deputy"
1 s and there-
fore "Martin Marietta was a director of Sperry Rand."'
0 Martin was
9. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (assistant
treasurer not officer); Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); SEC Rule X-3B-2, 17
C.F.. § 240, 3b-2 (1968).
10. Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); Ellerin v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959).
11. Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HAM. L.
R-v. 385, 400 (1953).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(7) (1964).
13. Blau v. Lehman, 368 US. 403 (1962); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.
1952) (Hand, J., concurring); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 967
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Molybdenum Corp. v. International Mining Corp., 32 F.R.D. 415,
418 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
14. This particular jurisdiction is "where the so-called '16(b) bar' is located," R.
JENNINGS & H. A wAR~, SEGORrr REGULATION 1032 (2d ed. 1963), thus accentuating the
impact of the decision.
15. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969).
16. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
17. See 406 F.2d at 263.
18. Id. at 266.
19. Id. at 264.
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forced to give to Sperry its short-swing profits on Sperry stock which
Martin purchased during Bunker's directorship.
The ramifications of Martin Marietta extend beyond its factual
setting. Manufacturers like Martin rely primarily on the production of
goods for their profits and are unlikely to be trading heavily in the
securities market. On the other hand, financial firms such as banks,
brokerage and underwriting houses, and various investment funds
rely substantially upon securities investments in other businesses.
When employees of these firms sit as directors of corporations, is a
finding of deputization more likely? As Wall Street acknowledges,
"[tfhe decision has opened a whole new can of worms. '" 20
II. The Case Law
A. Before Martin Marietta
Judge Learned Hand originated the theory of deputization under
Section 16(b) in Rattner v. Lehman.21 Lehman Brothers, an invest-
ment banking and brokerage partnership, realized short-swing profits
on the common stock of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation while
a Lehman partner, John Hertz, was a director of Consolidated.
Hertz gave his proportionate share of the partnership's profits to Con-
solidated, but a Consolidated shareholder brought suit for the entire
amount of the Lehman profits. The majority opinion exonerated the
partnership itself on the grounds that Section 16(b) contained no
requirement that partners of a director must account for their profits. 2
Judge Hand in his concurring opinion noted that the complaint
alleged that Hertz "advised and caused the defendant Lehman Brothers
20. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 24, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
21. 193 F.2d 564, 566 (1952) (Concurring opinion).
22. The Rattner majority based its decision partially upon SEC Rule X-16A-3(b) which
at that time required a partner to file a disclosure report under section 16(a) "only as to
that amount of such equity security which represents his proportionate interest in the
partnership." The SEC, which filed an amicus brief in Rattner, subsequently amended the
Rule to read:
A partner who is required under § 240.16a-1 to report in respect of any equity
security owned by the partnership shall indude in his report the entire amount of
such equity security owned by the partnership. He may, if he so elects, disclose the
extent of his interest in the partnership and the partnership transactions.
SEC Rule X-16A-3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(b) (Cum. Supp. (1961)). See 2 L. Loss,
SEcUtrIES REGULATION 1102-04 (1961).
However, the SEC stated that this change was "not intended as a modification of the
principles governing liability for short-swing transactions under Section 16(b) as set
forth in the case of Rattner v. Lehman." SEC Release No. 4754 (Sept. 24, 1952). In 1961
Rule X-16A-3 was again amended to omit any requirement that partners report partner.
ship holdings, but, in effect, the rule is intact in the SEC instructions to Forms 3 and 4
which are used to make § 16(a) disclosure reports.
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to purchase and sell 5000 shares of Vultee's stock." Hand speculated
as to the result if sufficient proof of this allegation had been submitted:
But I wish to say nothing as to whether, if a firm deputed a
partner to represent its interests as a director on the board, the
other partners would not be liable. True, they would not even
then be formally "directors"; but I am not prepared to say that
they could not be so considered; for some purposes the common
law does treat a firm as a jural person.24
The concept of deputization lay dormant for almost a decade, until
in 1962 it was revitalized by the Supreme Court in Blau v. Lehman.
25
Joseph Thomas, also a partner of Lehman Brothers, was a director of
the Tide Water Associated Oil Company when Lehman Brothers
realized short-swing profits on common shares of Tide Water. Testi-
mony was accepted at trial that Thomas did not disclose confidential
information of Tide Water affairs to any member of Lehman Brothers,
that Lehman Brothers purchased Tide Water stock solely on the basis
of public announcements made by Tide Water, and that Thomas did
not know of the initial purchase of Tide Water stock made by Lehman
Brothers. The Supreme Court for the first time considered Hand's
deputization theory, but felt that the lower court's finding precluded
a holding that Thomas was the deputy of Lehman.
Consequently, Lehman Brothers would be a director of Tide
Water, if as petitioner's complaint charged Lehman actually
functioned as a director through Thomas, who had been deputized
by Lehman to perform a director's duties not for himself but
for Lehman. But the findings of the two courts below, which we
have accepted, preclude such a holding. It was Thomas, not
Lehman Brothers as an entity, that was the director of Tide
Water.26
In Marquette Cement Manufacturing Co. v. Andreas the District
Court for the Southern District of New York considered, for the first
time, the applicability of the deputization theory to a corporate de-
fendant. Andreas was the sole trustee for nineteen trusts holding all
of the Andreas Corporation stock and was the trust beneficiary of 24.9
per cent of that stock. Most of the remaining beneficiaries were family
members. The Andreas Corporation in turn was a substantial stock-
23. 193 F.2d at 566.
24. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
25. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
26. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
27. 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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holder of the North American Cement Corporation. The Andreas
family arranged with Marquette Cement Manufacturing Corporation
to exchange the assets of North American for Marquette common
stock.
In February, North American stockholders (including the Andreas
Corporation) exchanged their shares for Marquette stock; in March,
Andreas was elected to the board of directors of Marquette; and in
April, the Andreas Corporation sold all of its Marquette stock on the
open market. A Marquette stockholder filed suit to recoup the short-
swing profits realized on the Marquette stock.
The plaintiff contended that Andreas was deputized by the Andreas
Corporation and that therefore the Corporation was liable as a director
of Marquette for all short-swing profits realized on Marquette stock.
In a brief statement, the court held that there was insufficient evidence
of deputization, despite the fact that Andreas effectively controlled the
Andreas Corporation:
Andreas' control over the Corporation is one factor to be con-
sidered in determining whether he was actually deputized to
represent Corporation interests on the Marquette Board. To
hold as a matter of law that an insider with interest in another
corporation cannot separate these roles would subvert the rationale
of the Rattner and Blau cases.2
8
The court in Marquette indicated that a finding of deputization re-
quires something more than a showing that the corporation shared
the inside information of a director. There can be no question that
the Andreas Corporation had access to all the inside information
available to Andreas himself; essentially, Andreas was the Andreas
Corporation. Since Section 16(b) was not intended to apply to all
persons who might have inside information, the court's decision is
sound. A finding of deputization should require not that the director
could make inside information available to his firm, but rather, as
Judge Hand in Rattner and Mr. Justice Black in Blau suggested, that
the director served his firm in such a way that the firm was the de facto
director of the issuer. Thus, for a firm to be liable under Section 16(b)
on a deputization theory, the early cases suggest that the firm must
share the advantages of other directors--both access to inside informa.
tion and power to manipulate the corporation.
28. Id. at 967.
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B. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corporation
With these cases in the background, the Second Circuit in Martin
Marietta-9 finally found deputization in a case arising under Section
16(b). An understanding of the basis and implications of the court's
holding requires close scrutiny of the facts of the case.
On two previous occasions Bunker, the president of Martin Marietta,
had refused invitations to serve on the Sperry Board. When Sperry
asked him a third time, in March 1963, he finally accepted. The district
court felt that the manner in which Bunker was invited onto the
Sperry Board cut against a finding of deputization:
Both lower courts in Blau v. Lehman placed considerable weight
on the fact that the invitation to join the Board was upon the
initiative of Tide Water and not the defendant partnership.
Similarly, here Sperry took the initiative. While such a showing
does not preclude a finding of deputization, it is a factor to be
considered along with the rest of the evidence bearing on this
issue. 0
The Second Circuit apparently drew no independent conclusion.
During the period when Bunker was being approached about
joining the Sperry Board, Martin was buying Sperry stock on the
open market. When Bunker finally accepted, Martin owned over
700,000 shares of Sperry common stock. Pursuant to Martin policy,
Bunker asked the Martin Board for permission to serve as a director
of Sperry. The Second Circuit noted that at this time Bunker informed
the Martin Board of Martin's substantial investment in Sperry. Bunker
testified that he "thought the Board would draw the inference that his
presence on Sperry's Board would be to Martin's interest."
3' The dis-
trict court concluded that "there was no evidence of any affirmative
action by Martin to cause Bunker to be made a Sperry director; nor
will the Board's conduct support even an inference that it deputized
him to represent its interests on Sperry's Board."
32 The Second Circuit,
however, felt that the Martin Board's approval of Bunker's director-
ship of Sperry was at least probative of deputization: "surely such con-
duct by the Martin Board supports an inference that it deputized
Bunker to represent its interests on Sperry's Board."
33
29. 406 F.2d 260 (2nd Cir. 1969).
30. 286 F. Supp. at 944.
81. 406 F.2d at 265, quoting 286 F. Supp. at 945.
32. 286 F. Supp. at 45.
3. 406 F.2d at 265-66.
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Martin had a policy of placing representatives on the Boards of
other corporations, particularly those in which Martin was a substan-
tial shareholder or a parent. Martin expected "some association
between the two companies" and actively participated in the manage-
ment of the companies on whose Boards it had placed a director.
Sometimes Martin told its representatives "what positions to take on
various matters, and they report[ed] back to Martin what [was] going
on in the companies on whose boards they [sat]."34 However, there
was no evidence that Bunker himself reported back to Martin and
asked for instructions. The district court found the testimony as to
Martin's policy inconclusive, but the Second Circuit determined that
although
Bunker had no duty to report back to Martin, [o]therwise Bunker
was a typical Martin deputy. In view of Bunker's position of al-
most absolute authority over Martin's affairs, such differences
hardly suffice to refute the evidentiary value of the similarities
between the functions of Bunker and those of Martin's representa-
tives on other corporate boards.35
While Bunker was a Sperry director, Martin purchased 101,300 ad-
ditional shares of Sperry stock. Bunker had ultimate authority over
Martin stock purchases36 but did not necessarily "cause" the purchase
of Sperry stock. Both courts noted that such conduct contrasted with
that in Blau v. Lehman, where the court found that the stock of Tide
Water was bought and sold by Lehman without any advice or concur-
rence of Thomas, and without his knowledge until after the transac-
tion had taken place.37
In addition, Bunker testified that he discussed Sperry matters with
Martin officials, but that he "did not receive information that would
affect an investment in any regard; rather most of the information he
obtained while a director had to do with Sperry's 'operational situa-
tion.' "381 Both courts held that, without more, the possibility that
inside information was obtained or disclosed did not mandate that
Bunker was Martin's deputy.3 9 The Second Circuit, however, found
that the Bunker-Martin relationship differed in significant respects from
that in Blau v. Lehman:
34. 286 F. Supp. at 947.
35. 406 F.2d at 266.
36. 286 F. Supp. at 945.
37. 368 U.S. at 406.
38. 286 F. Supp. at 946.
39. 406 F.2d at 265; cf. 286 F. Supp. at 946.
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In contrast . . . the Lehman partner exercised no power of ap-
proval concerning the partnership's investment; was not consulted
for advice; had no advance knowledge of Lehman Brothers' in-
tention to purchase the stock of the corporation of which he was
a member of the board of directors; and never discussed the
operating details of that corporation's affairs with any member
of Lehman Brothers.40
The district court gave less weight to an anonymous memorandum
in the Martin files entitled "Notes on Exploratory Investment in Sperry
Rand Corporation," since much of it contained individual opinions
and publicly available information. On the other hand, the Second
Circuit found that the Memorandum "further indicates that Martin
Marietta may have benefited, or intended to benefit, from Bunker's
association with Sperry Rand."
41
The Second Circuit also felt that the circumstances of Bunker's
resignation from the Sperry Board were probative of deputization.
The court attached great significance to one sentence of Bunker's
letter of resignation: "When I became a member of the Board in April,
it appeared to your associates that the Martin Marietta ownership of a
substantial number of shares of Sperry Rand should have representation
on your Board."-' While the district court preferred instead to accept
testimony that neither Sperry nor Martin considered Bunker as Mar-
tin's deputy, the Second Circuit found that:
[C]ertainly the more logical inference from the wording of Bun-
ker's letter of resignation is the inference that Bunker served on
the Sperry Board as a representative of Martin Marietta so as to
protect Martin's investment in Sperry.
43
On the basis of these findings, the Second Circuit decided that:
[T]he control possessed by Bunker, his letter of resignation, the
approval by the Martin Board of Bunker's directorship with
Sperry, and the functional similarity between Bunker's acts as a
Sperry director and the acts of Martin's representatives on the
other boards . . . are all definite and concrete indicatives that
Bunker, in fact, was a Martin deputy.44
Particularly in light of the fact that the district court drew the opposite
conclusion from precisely the same facts, this language fails to provide
40. 406 F.2d at 265, citing 368 US. at 406.
41. Id. at 264.
42. Id. at 265.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 266.
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clear standards for a determination of deputization on any given set
of facts. The court's reliance on Bunker's control and Martin's policy
of placing representatives on other boards suggests that Martin was
actually functioning as a director of Sperry. Under Blau and Rattner,
"functioning as a director" is the test of deputization. But the court's
reliance on the inferences it drew from Martin's approval of the direc-
torship and from Bunker's letter of resignation suggests that the court
may be interpreting deputization to mean that Bunker served as
Sperry's director with the intent of supplying Martin with inside
information. That is to say, Bunker spied on Sperry for Martin or
served as Martin's earpiece on Sperry's board, but Bunker did not
attempt to influence Sperry's policy at Martin's direction.
The briefs for Martin Marietta strenuously objected to the appel-
lant's suggestion that if Bunker served as a director of Sperry for the
purpose of conveying information to Martin, then Bunker was Martin's
deputy.45 Bunker could have performed his duties as a director ac-
cording to his personal judgment and yet still have provided Martin
with inside information. Under such circumstances, Martin Marietta
could hardly be said to have been acting as a director. Only where
the corporation actively manages the issuer through its deputy does it
truly function as a director.
46
45. "The presence or absence of some action amounting to 'deputization' by Martin is
thus the crucial factual issue-not 'whether Bunker served as a Sperry director in order to
serve Martin's interests.'" Brief for Appellee Martin Marietta at 12, Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969). In a petition for rehearing Martin again raised
the issue:
The cardinal question, therefore, is whether Martin itself "actually functioned as a
director" of Sperry or deputized Bunker to perform a director's duties not for himself
but for Martin. The District Court held that there was no evidence of this kind of
deputization. This Court's opinion, however, never considers whether Martin per-
formed a director's function, but rather deals with a more nebulous concept of whether
Bunker in some way "representetd Martin's interests" on Sperry's Board.
Brief for Appellee Martin Marietta, Petition for Rehearing en Bane at 7, Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969). Martin also accused the Second Circuit of
"[laying] down a per se rule of liability and [expanding] the definition of 'director' as
used in the Act." Id. at 8; see The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L. Rv. 54, 217
n.223 (1962).
46. The following hypotheticals may help make this distinction clearer:
(1) X, an officer of firm A, is a director of issuer B. X votes on the B Board In accordance
with his sound business judgment of what will most benefit B. A owns under ten per cent
of the stock of issuer B. X approves A's purchases of B stock. A has no influencing interest
in B's management but does find it desirable to have an earpiece on B's Board who will
give A advance warning of anticipated market gains or declines in B's stock so that A
can maximize profits and minimize losses by timely purchases and sales.
(2) X is to disclose all important inside information to A and is to vote on crucial B
matters as directed by A. A takes an active role in managing B through X. A is interested
in more than merely having access to information relevant to its investment in B. This
interest in the control of B is the result of one of the following relationships: A anticipates
merger with B; B is a subsidiary of A; A and B have a customer-supplier relationship; A
and B are competitors; A has recently underwritten a securities distribution for B; A is
1160
Deputization Under Section 16(b)
At times, the court seemed to draw inferences of deputization from
evidence that Bunker provided Martin with information to protect
Martin's investment in Sperry. One interpretation is that the Martin
Board may have envisioned Bunker's directorship as desirable because
he would be able to anticipate market fluctuations in Sperry stock. At
least, there was no evidence to the contrary. To gain approval for his
directorship, Bunker reminded the Martin Board of Martin's invest-
ment in Sperry stock, but Martin expressed no interest in acting as
the functional director of Sperry. Bunker's approval of purchases of
Sperry stock indicates Bunker's use of inside information to promote
Martin's investment plans rather than his serving as Martin's deputy
in the control of Sperry. The Martin memorandum confirms this in-
terest in investment rather than in functional management.47 Under
such an interpretation, Martin Marietta is hardly distinguishable from
Andreas. Martin may have had inside information, but this alone does
not lead to the conclusion that Martin participated as a director.
The Second Circuit touched upon another possible rationale for
concluding that Martin Marietta functioned as a director of Sperry.
If Bunker's control over Martin was absolute, he could designate
himself as the instrument by which Martin functioned as a director of
Sperry. The district court noted that "Bunker was president, chief
executive officer, director, and stockholder of Martin,"48 but was not
convinced that he had absolute control over Martin or that he had
designated himself as the deputy of Martin. The Second Circuit
focused on this issue when it remarked that:
heavily invested in the debt securities of B; or any one of a host of other relationships
may exist. It is clear that A intends to "actually function as a director through [X] who
had been deputized by [A] to perform a director's duties not for himself but for [A .'"
Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 410 (1962). In the first hypothetical, whid is based on the
facts of In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) only the investment
interest is represented. In the second, the firm, A, is functioning as a director.
47. Other evidence, not discussed by the court, might have been more relevant to die
issue of deputization. Murphy, The Millions Under Martin Marietta's Mattres, FortrNE,
Nov. 1963, at 135, indicates that at the time of the transactions in question Martin
Marietta was actively soliciting a merger partner. Sperry was a likely candidate and Bunker
probably hoped that his directorship might lead to a meeting of the minds and a
subsequent merger. This evidence was highly relevant and should have been examined
carefully. A corporation anticipating a possible merger will fill a directorship on the
issuer's board primarily for the purpose of realizing a successful merger and only sec-
ondarily to realize insider profits. The merger would be top priority with the expectant
corporation and it most likely would function as the issuer's director through its deputy
to advance and facilitate the merger. If this evidence existed, it might have made out a
dear case of deputization.
Plaintiff Feder attempted to put excerpts from the Fortune article into evidence in the
lower court. However, the district court ruled that these statements were inadmissible
hearsay. 286 F. Supp. at 941. Nevertheless, a dose cross-examination of Bunker regarding
the merger tactics might have born fruit for the plaintiff, even if the article could not be
introduced.
48. 286 F. Supp. at 948.
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A person in Bunker's unique position could act as a deputy for
Martin Marietta even in the absence of factors indicating an
intention or belief on the part of both companies that he was so
acting.49
We are not told what facts are necessary to a finding of self-deputization.
A president of a corporation would normally be its chief executive
officer, a director, and a shareholder. Does the existence of this power,
by itself lead to Section 16(b) liability for the corporation? The Second
Circuit said that power over the deputizing corporation was not
enough to establish deputization, and proceeded to find other evidence.
One wonders, however, if the court would have decided differently had
there been no other evidence.
Perhaps a deeper inquiry into the degree of control Bunker exer-
cised over Martin would have disclosed absolute power. Where total
control does exist, a court might determine either that the controlling
person could and did deputize himself, or that the actions of the
corporation should not be recognized as distinct from the actions of the
person who controls the corporation 0 when those actions circumvent
Section 16(b) policy.51
49. 406 F.2d at 265.
50. The Second Circuit's suggestion resembles the alter ego theory, or "piercing the
corporate veil". A corporation's existence as an entity distinct from its shareholders may
sometimes be ignored for certain purposes, most notably when recognition of a separate
existence would act as a fraud upon third parties. E.g., Minton v. Cavancy, 56 Cal.2d 576,
15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 364 P.2d 473 (1961); First Nat. Bank v. Gamble, 134 Tex. 112, 182
S.W.2d 100 (1939). The corporate entity might be disregarded when failure to do so
would allow the corporate entity to circumvent a statute. Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co.,
353 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1965). Usually the corporate entity is ignored only when majority
stockholders have formed a corporation to avoid personal liability. However, other
relationships might give rise to this refusal to recognize. For example, in In re Tuttle's
Estate, 4 N.Y.2d 159, 173 N.Y.S.2d 279, 149 N.E.2d 715 (1958), the corporate entity was
disregarded as distinct from the executors of the estate of the majority shareholder. The
executor's control was the result of their unique position, namely that they were able to
exercise effective control despite the lack of beneficial ownership of a majority of the
corporation's stock.
51. To hold Martin Marietta liable the Second Circuit had to find not only that
Martin deputized Bunker but also that section 16(b) applies to profits realized after
Bunker resigned from the Sperry Board. Section 16(b) liability attaches to a "director [for]
any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase." In Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959), the Second Circuit held that this provision applies to
the sale by a director who purchased before he became a director. But the Martin Marietta
transactions are distinguishable. Section 16(b) holds the insider liable for "any profit
realized by him" and this logically means "profit realized by him" while lie Is an
insider since "him" is the pronoun referring to a "beneficial owner, director, or officer."
Put another way, a person is not a "him" when he is not a "beneficial owner, director,
or officer." The SEC recognized this distinction. Section 16(a), the reporting provision of
Section 16, requires that an insider report his transactions in the issuer's stock while a
director; no reports are required for transactions after the person ceases to be a director.
SEC Rule 16a-10 provides that anyone who does not have to comply with the reporting
requirements of Section 16(a) is "likewise exempted from section 16(b)." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-10 (1968). See 2 L. Loss, SECUlTms REGULATION 1061 (2d ed. 1961). The Second
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III. The Meaning of Deputization
The court's lack of clarity as to what constitutes deputization gives
rise to the possibility that when employees or officers of a corporation
serve on the board of the issuer for the purpose of conveying informa-
tion to the corporation, the corporation will be held liable for short-
swing profits even though it does not participate in the management
of the issuer. Such an interpretation of 16(b) would conflict both with
the way courts have understood deputization in the past and with the
policies underlying the regulation of insider trading.
Courts considering deputization have had no problem theorizing
that a corporation can be a director under Section 16(b). Section
3(a)(7)52 of the Securities Act of 1934 states that under the Act, "'direc-
tor' means any director of a corporation or any person performing
similar functions with respect to any organization." "Person" is defined
by Section 3(a)(9),5 3 to include a corporation. Thus, a corporation that
performs functions similar to those of a director would be a director
under the statute. The Supreme Court in Blau v. Lehmanr" integrated
the statutory test of directorship with its test of deputization when it
asked whether "Lehman actually functioned as a director through
Thomas who had been deputized by Lehman to perform a director's
duties not for himself but for Lehman."' 5 Thus both the statute and
the test articulated by the Court require for a finding of deputization
that a factual determination be made that the corporation performed
the duties of, or functioned as, a director.
The corporation that has an "earpiece" director on the issuer's
board, but does not function as a director, violates the policy of equal
access to investment information for all investors when it receives and
trades on advance corporate information. If this conduct, without
more, constitutes deputization, judicial construction of Section 16(b)
will conflict with unequivocal legislative history,50 the statutory defi-
Circuit's holding is novel and open to question. One can now be a director when not
dearly designated as such as well as after one's resignation has been tendered and
accepted.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(7) (1964).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(9) (1964).
54. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
55. Id. at 410.
56. Congress considered and rejected a provision that prohibited directors, officers, or
five per cent stockholders from disclosing confidential information and provided that short-
swing profits realized by "any person to whom such unlawful disclosure shall have been
made is recoverable by the issuer." H.R. 7852, S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The
interpretation of this provision is found in Hearings before the Comm. on Banking and
Currency on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. Res. 56, 97, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess. 6555, 6558, 6560-61 (1934); Hearings before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 7852 and HIR. 8720, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 135-37 (1934).
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nition of a director,5 7 and traditional notions of directorship.58 Never-
theless, policy grounds might justify application of Section 16(b) if
failure to apply that section to earpiece directors would result in the
exoneration of improper conduct. However, since other provisions of
the securities acts-most notably Section 10(b)19 and SEC Rule lOb-510
-impose civil and criminal liability for trading on inside information,
application of 16(b) is unnecessary.
For example, in In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.01 a brokerage
firm partner who executed sell orders on the basis of inside information
from a firm employee who sat on the issuer's board was held to have
violated Rule lOb-5. Insiders in the position of Cady, Roberts & Co.
must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue
of their position but which are not known to persons with whom
they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment
judgment. Failure to make disclosure constitutes a violation of
the anti-fraud provisions.
62
While a director who is merely an earpiece might not be a deputy
under Section 16(b), it is certain that his conduct is a violation of lOb-5.
A showing that the issuer's director had advance information, that he
relayed it to the defendant, and that the defendant realized short-swing
profits on the basis of this information would satisfy both provisions
if serving as an earpiece constitutes deputization under Section 16(b).
03
57. See p. 1163 supra.
58. See p. 1161 supra.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968). Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1964), is identical to lob-5, but applies only when the plaintiff has purchased
securities. Section 17(a) seemed unnecessary after the SEC promulgated lOb-5, but recently
it has been held that punitive damages may sometimes be recovered under Section 17(a),
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), thus making
Section 17(a) more attractive to defrauded purchasers than lOb.5, which limits recovery
to actual damages.
61. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The implications of this case are thoroughly considered In
Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAw. 939 (1962).
62. 40 S.E.C. at 911.
63. More specifically, to succeed under lOb-5 the private plaintiff must show the
following: (1) a purchase or sale, (2) an interstate contact, (3) the failure to disclose
material inside information by the defendant, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 848-53 (2d Cir. 1968), (4) reliance on the nondisclosure, List v. Faslon Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965), and (5) resultant damages to the purchaser or seller. As
Cady, Roberts demonstrates, a purchase from or sale to a corporate defendant who does
not disclose material inside information received from an employee serving on the
issuer's board violates lOb-5.
In applying lOb-5 to corporations who have their investment interests represented on
the board of an issuer, the SEC and courts are holding "tippees" of an insider liable on
the same basis that the insider would be liable under lOb-5. Cady, Roberts is a classic
example of "tippee" liability. Other examples are Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("If [defendants] were not insiders, they would seem to have been 'tippees'
(persons give information by insiders in breach of trust) and subject to the same duty as
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In this context Rule lOb-5 implements desired securities policy
more effectively than does Section 16(b). Under lOb-5, the purchaser
or seller of the securities, rather than the corporate issuer, recovers
damages.6 The aggrieved purchaser or seller will more effectively
enforce securities policy under lOb-5 than will the stockholders of cor-
porate issuer under Section 16(b). The issuer, as in Martin Mfarietta,
often resists suit against its director and its corporation.05 Thus the
initiative must come from the issuer's shareholders, who are not as
seriously injured as a purchaser or seller and will be less disposed to
bring suit.66 Moreover, the SEC has injunctive and punitive powers
under l0b-567 that do not exist under Section 16(b).68
When the defendant corporation actually performs the functions of a
director, there are sound policy reasons for using Section 16(b). "Sec-
tion 16(b) can be rationalized as an antimanipulation device but not as
an effective prohibition of insider trading."00 Too many escapes from
insiders."); In the Matter of Blyth & Co. and Briggs, Sec. E.x. Act Rel. No. 8499 (1969); In
the Matter of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8459
(1968); In the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, 401 F.2d 833, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1968), te SEC even
charged that second generation "tippees" were liable, but neither court reached this
isssue. The Second Circuit did note in dictum that, although the "tippees" were not
defendants in the action, "there conduct . . . certainly could be equally reprehensible."
Id. at 853.
64. "[Rjecovery under the Section [16(b)] aids not the persons injured-those who
bought from or sold to the insider-but the corporations, which suffered no injury." 2
L. Loss, Sxcurrrss REGULATION 1088 (1961).
65. Sperry Rand was a party defendant in the action. Sperry filed a brief in Martin's
defense that was "quite well documented." Letter from Mr. Cecil Wray, Jr. to Mr. Carroll
L. Wagner, Jr., April 8, 1969. In all four cases where courts have considered the deputiza.
tion issue, the suit was initiated by a shareholder of the issuer rather than the issuer
itself. An issuer apparently is reluctant to bring suit against a corporation with which it
has an interlocking directorship.
66. The timidity of the 16(b) plaintiff is evident from the fact that not until 1940 vas
a 16(b) action begun. As of 1951 only 30 such actions had been recorded.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1964). After the SEC invokes its injunctive and punitive power
under 10b-5, a host of private plaintiffs may file civil suits. For example, after the SEC
instituted action against Texas Gulf Sulphur, 49 private actions involving at least 475
plaintiffs were brought (as of 1966). 258 F. Supp. 262 at 267 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Of course,
the private plaintiff is not compelled to await SEC action and usually does not delay.
68. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the SEC
proceeded against, among others, Thomas Lamont, a director of both TGS and Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co., for allegedly informing Morgan Guaranty of advance TGS informa.
tion so that the Morgan Trust department could purchase TGS stock before release of the
information raised the market price. SEC Rule lOb-5 was relied upon rather than 16(b), so
there were no allegations of deputization. The court found that the inside information was
released to the public before Morgan was informed so that purchasers or sellers had equal
access to the information. Nevertheless, the case further indicates the SEC's willingness to
proceed under lob-5 when a case of representation of investment interests is involved.
69. H. MANNE, INsDER TRADING AND THE STocr, MARKEr 30 (1966). Congress was par-
ticularly concerned with the prevalence of corporate manipulation when it drafted
Section 16(b). Glaring examples of manipulative practices came to the attention of the
Senate. In one instance, directors organized a syndicate to trade in their issuer's stock
before the issuer had paid any dividends. Thereafter the directors caused the issuer to
declare irregular dividends so that the syndicate could profit from the stock market
fluctuations. Dividends were declared by the directors despite the fact that the issuer's
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the arbitrarily-drawn provisions exist for it to rival Rule lOb-5 as a
broad and equitable prophylactic to insider trading.
7 However, Sec-
tion 16(b) can be effective to prevent manipulation of the corporation
for the insider's short-swing gain. Artificial corporate manipulation, un-
like insider trading, directly injures the corporate issuer and all of its
shareholders. For this reason the insider's profits which may have
resulted from manipulation should redound to the issuer rather than
to the securities seller or purchaser.
Because of the difficulty of proving manipulation, antimanipulation
policy is more effectively implemented by an arbitrary prohibition on
trading by persons in a position to manipulate. A corporation can
effectively manipulate an issuer by exercising de facto voting rights
on the issuer's board. The corporation which seeks inside information
only to promote its investment interest in the issuer cannot offend the
antimanipulative policy of Section 16(b).71 It has violated the policy
of lOb-5 and can accordingly be held liable under that provision. But
in the absence of any possibility of manipulation the issuer cannot have
suffered any harm and should not be allowed to recover damages,
especially when another securities provision sanctions trading on inside
information and rewards damages to the person who has suffered harm.
"The Supreme Court's opinion in Blau v. Lehman is consistent with
earnings were insufficient to meet them and the issuer's capital surplus had to be used
to make dividend payments. S. RP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
Manipulation and stock options might be combined for profit, for example, by a board
of directors' declaration of artificially high dividends, the placement of "calls" (option to
purchase) on the market by the directors, and the subsequent public disclosure of the
high dividends. The next quarter the directors might balance out their initial action by
setting dividends inappropriately low, placing "puts" (option to sell) on tile market, and
announcing the low declaration. This combination of manipulation and options was on
Congressional minds when it drafted section 16(b):
the granting of options ... has been found to be at the bottom of most manipulative
operations, because the granting of these options permits large-scale manipulations
to be conducted with a minimum of financial risk to the manipulators.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934).
70. [T]he one policy determination which Congress clearly made was that § 16(b)
should operate as automatically-indeed, as arbitrarily-as possible whether irthe result
be to include or exclude. One cannot have both automaticity and equity. On proof
of actual abuse of inside information, other remedies exist, both statutory (see
especially Rule lOb-5 ... ) and judge-made ....
2 L. Loss, SEcu~a~rEs REGULATION 33 (Supp. 1962). Professor Loss agreed with tile Blau v.
Lehman outcome in that it avoided expansion of Section 16(b) coverage into an area where
subjective elements determine liability. Id.
71. Similarly, only a functional director can be thought to owe any general fiduciary
duty to the corporate issuer. Congress, in drafting Section 16(b), was also concerned with
"the vicious practices unearthed at the hearings [which involved] the flagrant betrayal of
their fiduciary duties by directors and officers." S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55
(1934). The corporate trader who only has an earpiece on the issuer's board has violated
no fiduciary duty since none can possibly be owed to the issuer in the absence of either
de facto or de jure directorship. The informant, however, would stand in a different
position.
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this explanation .... [T]he Blau decision limited that Section to
serving this antimanipulation purpose. ' '7-
Section 16(b) was designed to prevent the misuse of the office of
director both to manipulate the corporation and to garner inside in-
formation. The statute is not needed to prevent corporations from
using inside information obtained from their employees who happen
to be directors of other corporations, for that activity can be reached
under lOb-5. The problems of proof, which caused Congress to autho-
rize liability under 16(b) regardless of whether or not inside information
was actually used, are not alleviated when applying 16(b) to a corpora-
tion that only receives inside information from an earpiece director.
It would still be necessary to prove that information was transferred
from deputy to deputizing corporation before 16(b) liability can be
found. Thus there is no need to apply 16(b) under the deputization
theory unless the deputizing corporation actually serves as a director.
In that situation, the antimanipulative policy requires the application
of 16(b) because lOb-5 may not apply and because manipulation will be
very difficult to prove. But unless a corporation actually functions as a
director, 16(b) should not be used.73
IV. Deputization in Other Contexts
In the wake of Martin Marietta potential Section 16(b) plaintiffs
may well survey all outside employment by directors of their issuer
and contemplate suit against the primary employer of the outside
director if that employer realizes short-term profits on the issuer's stock.
Recovery from a deputizing director will depend to a large extent upon
the criteria of deputization adopted by the courts. The courts may
characterize as deputization for the purposes of 16(b) either (1) the
designation of an employee to convey inside information that would
affect the investment interests of his employer, (2) the use of that em-
ployee as a conduit for managerial decisions made by the employer,
72. H. MANNE, INsmER TRADMG AND TmE STOCK ALxn 30 (1966).
73. When a director represents his corporation's investment interests on the issuer's
board in the narrow sense that he assures that his constituent's transactions in the
issuer's stock will be conducted with the benefit of advance information, this relationship
should be relevant but not determinative of deputization. This is the way the district
court treated the evidence of willingness to disclose inside information to Martin. 286 F.
Supp. at 945-46. In Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), the evidence demonstrated that
the partnership was not the recipient of any inside information. This evidence is relevant
to a defense against a deputization allegation since it is inconceivable that a company
would function as a director of another company without garnishing the inside information
that directors must have. Proof of nondisclosure should be a complete defense, but proof
of disclosure should be insufficient, by itself, to prove deputization.
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or (3) a mixed use of the employee as in Martin Marietta. The im-
portance of the investment interest to the deputizing defendant and
the importance of the defendant's involvement in the managerial
decisions of the issuer will vary according to the nature of the defen-
dant's business. For instance, a manufacturer-defendant is less likely
to depend upon securities trading as a primary source of profit, and
therefore may be less concerned with inside information than a defen-
dant which relies almost exclusively on market investment for its profit.
Since direct evidence of deputization will not often exist in any context,
courts, as in Martin Marietta,74 will have to draw inferences from
circumstantial evidence. The nature of the defendant's business will be
one factor on which the courts will rely. It may be helpful to speculate
as to how an inference of deputization might arise in different business
contexts.
A. Trust Activities of Commercial Banks
In 1968 the staff of the House Subcommittee on Domestic Finance
of the Committee on Banking and Currency explored the trust activi-
ties of commercial banksj 5 Of the forty-nine banks surveyed "a total of
768 interlocking directorships with 286 of the 500 largest industrial
corporations" were found to exist.7 0 "One bank . . . reported 401
companies in which it held 5 per cent or more of one or more classes
of stock. Another bank ... reported 278 companies with which it has
326 director interlocks. '77 The study was particularly interested in
"commercial bank involvement in the control of other corporations
through trust department investments .... 78 The Staff Report recom-
mended
[a]pplication of the prohibition against short-swing profits by cor-
porate insiders as embodied in section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to securities dealings of trust departments
which have director interlocks with corporations whose securities
are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
9
This recommendation was directed to the legislative and administrative
74. See 286 F. Supp. at 942.
75. SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE HOUSE Comm. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST AcmvrrlES: EMERGING INFLUENCE ON TIlE AMEIUCAN
EcONOMY, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 1 (1968).
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 8.
79. Id. at 9.
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branches of government.8 0 However, the judiciary may be the first
governmental branch to heed the call through the deputization concept.
Commercial banks sometimes advertise their willingness to become
intimately involved in the management of loan customers. For instance,
one large New York bank advertised its relationship with one of its
clients:
We liked their ideas. We set up a $500,000 line of credit. We in-
vestigated potential customers for them. As their business grew,
we continued to supply working capital. They consulted us on
selection of a New York investment banker. And when they went
on the big board, they named us Transfer Agent.8'
Another customer
used us for his first major capital expansion .... We used our
European offices for advice and arranged Eurodollar financing for
his expansion overseas. And he used our counsel when the time
came to go public.
This man used us expertly from the beginning. He's using us
today. We expect to be with him for his next idea. And the next.
And the one after that. 2
This is the same bank that reported 326 director interlocks with 278
companies in 1968.s8 Under certain circumstances this relationship may
give rise to deputization.
A corporation often relies upon a single bank for most of its banking
needs. For example, this bank may provide credit, open accounts,
and administer the corporation's pension and profit-sharing programs
through its trust department.3 4 It is advisable for a corporation to have
a banker on its board of directors since his particular talents are of
80. Id.
81. BusinEss Ws-n, April 12, 1969, at 117.
82. FORTUNE, April, 1969, at 35.
83. See p. 1168 supra.
84. Included in the trust funds held by banks are the assets of eighty-one per cent of
the pension and profit-sharing plans created by American corporations. Id. at 3. This
concentration of funds with banks has been a particular source of concern:
The question of economic power in the pension funds becomes more urgent when
we consider that their activities are not subject to the same degree of governmental
regulation as are those of other financial institutions of comparable size. We find a
greater concentration of control in the pension trust than among the mutual funds,
the insurance companies, and, probably, the banks holding personal trusts. And yet,
unlike the pension trusts, the mutual funds are subject to the regulation of the SEC.
the insurance companies are rigidly governed by state agencies and the trustees of
personal trusts have to account to beneficiaries (though this accounting may not
amount to much as a preventive check). The bank trustees are therefore in a position
to wield considerable economic power through their control of the pension trusts, a
power which is further extended through their stockholdings for personal trusts.
P. I-H. BsCsT, PENSION FUrNDS AN'D EcoNomic PowER, 235 (1959).
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special benefit to the company. The corporation normally would select
a director from the bank which it uses for most of its banking needs,
since this banker will have a greater knowledge of and interest in the
company. The bank's trust assets will in part be invested in the equity
securities of corporate issuers. Knowledge of a particular corporation's
business and access to its advance corporate information will increase
the "safety" of a bank's investment in that corporation and may thus
induce the bank to include that corporation in its investment portfolio.
Furthermore, the bank's interest in promoting the welfare of the cor-
poration is not limited to the maximization of its trust investment
profits; the bank also seeks to build good will in the business com-
munity generally, to assure repayment of its loans to the corporation,
and to promote the growth of the loan customer so that its size and,
concurrently, its banking needs will increase. If this relationship does
exist, short-swing trading by the bank's trust department is inadvisable
unless there is strong evidence of functional and communicative inter-
nal segregation of the director and the commercial and trust depart-
ments. If there is any evidence that the banker-director, before making
a corporate board determination, consults the trust or commercial de-
partments of his bank as to the impact of the company's action on the
bank's interests in collecting loans or administering trust assets, then
the bank would be functioning as a director and a case of deputization
could probably be made out under current decisions
s5
B. Brokers and Underwriters
Blau v. Lehman 6 seemingly established the standards of behavior for
insiders who are members of underwriter and brokerage firms. The
Lehman partner disclosed no confidential information, and Lehman
Brothers purchased the issuer's stock without the interlocking partner's
knowledge. The defendants were exonerated because "the profits made
by the partnership were on its own initiative, independently of any
advice or 'inside' knowledge given it by director Thomas."
87 Presum-
ably, if information had been divulged and the partner had approved
the purchases, deputization would have been established. Martin Mari-
etta may suggest a more difficult barrier to proof of deputization,
despite the opposite results, if the case is interpreted to mean that a
deputizing corporation must function as a director. Under this inter-
85. See note 64 supra.
86. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
87. Id. at 409.
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pretation, Blau and Martin Marietta suggest that receipt and use of
inside information by an underwriter-broker may constitute deputiza-
tion, whereas more may be required to prove deputization by a non-
broker defendant. If subsequent cases do reflect this distinction, it
will probably be grounded in a general attitude that brokers and under-
writers, because of their greater intimacy with the securities market,
should be held to higher standards of conduct. Of course, there is no
statutory basis in Section 16(b) for this distinction.
The danger of functional directorship by the underwriting firm will
exist most frequently when the firm is underwriting a new securities
distribution for the issuer. From the time a distribution is planned
until it is successfully completed many decisions of the issuer's board
of directors will be made in light of the distribution. Dividend declara-
tions, expansion plans, and other vital corporate decisions must be
made with an awareness of their impact on the distribution. The
issuer's underwriter will be best able to predict the impact of a deci-
sion and will of necessity be frequently consulted. Especially if the
underwriting is on a "firm offer" basis, the underwriter will be in-
terested in decisions which may mean success or failure to the distribu-
tion, and it will attempt to influence relevant corporate decisions. "In
the past, [the underwriter] has often insisted upon putting one or more
of his nominees on the board of directors . . . ."8 If the underwriter
involves itself intimately in the issuer's business-as it must to guar-
antee a successful distribution and to prepare an accurate registration
statement-short-swing trading in the outstanding securities of the
issuer would almost certainly give rise to section 16(b) liability through
deputization.
C. Investment Funds
Since their success depends directly upon their performance in the
securities market, investment funds (mutual funds, non-profit founda-
tions, insurance companies, and the like) will be encouraged to obtain
access to inside information, possibly through directorships. However,
with few exceptions, these organizations will not want to function as a
director or actively manage the issuers in whose securities they trade.
The extracurricular activities which encourage functional directorship
(such as underwriting, banking, and conglomeration) are foreign to
investment funds. Most mutual funds and insurance companies prefer
88. Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA.
L. REv. 1, 55 (1969).
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to move freely in the market without becoming too involved with any
particular corporation. Some non-profit foundations invest heavily in
particular companies, but such investments usually exceed ten percent,
so that a showing of deputization is not required to bring them un-
der Section 16(b). Insurance companies, and to a lesser extent mutual
funds, sometimes invest heavily in the debt securities of a company,
and creditors may be more interested in deputizing an employee to
serve on the board of their debtor. When such a heavy investment
exists, short-swing trading in the equity securities of the company is
inadvisable. The extent to which Section 16(b) will be applied to vari-
ous investment funds will depend upon the relative weights given by
the courts to evidence of earpiece directorship and functional director-
ship.
V. Conclusion
Much remains to be learned about the viability of the deputization
theory under Section 16(b). The Martin Marietta decision has been
appealed. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari in Martin
Marietta,89 more exact knowledge of the breadth of deputization may
be obtained. Some guidance as to the weight that should be accorded
evidence of receipt and use of inside information is imperative. If a
showing of directorship and use of inside information is sufficient to
prove a case of deputization, a precisely limited statute will be virtually
rewritten into a broad prophylactic measure much like that rejected
by the legislative framers of Section 16(b). Other provisions of the
securities acts are better designed to accomplish whatever functions
might be performed by such judicial policy, and the benefits of these
provisions inure to the party that has suffered real injury. The Supreme
Court is not deaf to this dilemma. In Blatt v. Lehman, the first case in
which the Supreme Court considered the deputization theory under
Section 16(b), the court wrote:
The argument of petitioner and the Commission seems to go so
far as to suggest that § 16(b)'s forfeiture of profits should be ex-
tended to include all persons realizing "short swing" profits who
either act on the basis of "inside" information or have the pos-
sibility of "inside" information. One may agree that petitioner
and the Commissioner present persuasive policy arguments that
the Act should be broadened in this way to prevent "the unfair
89. Petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3452 (May 27, 1969).
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use of information" more effectively than can be accomplished by
leaving the Act so as to require forfeiture of profits only by those
specifically designated by Congress to suffer those losses. But this
very broadening of the categories of persons on whom these liabili-
ties are imposed by the language of § 16(b) was considered and
rejected by Congress when it passed the Act....
Not only did Congress refuse to give § 16(b) the content we are
now urged to put into it by interpretation, but with knowledge
that in 1952 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused, in the
Rattner case, to apply § 16(b) to Lehman Brothers in circum-
stances substantially like those here, Congress has left the Act as it
was.. .. Congress can and might amend § 16(b) if the Commission
would present to it the policy arguments it has presented to us,
but we think that Congress is the proper agency to change an
interpretation of the Act unbroken since its passage, if the change
is to be made.90
It is also necessary to determine what liability under a deputization
theory augurs for other duties and liabilities under the securities acts.
Concern for the broader implications of the Martin Marietta decision
has already engrossed Wall Street:
The case opens up all kinds of new perils in intercorporate rela-
tionships. "This really creates a lot of problems," says one. "If
Martin Marietta were the director rather than Bunker, should
Martin Marietta file insider trading reports? And who should sign
a securities registration statement if Sperry wants to issue stock?
Martin Marietta, Bunker or both?" 1
90. 568 US. at 411-12.
91. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 24, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
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